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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Patrick

Lawrence Grom appeals from the order 0f the

district court

judgment entered by the magistrate court upon Grom’s guilty plea

On

inﬂuence.

appeal t0 this Court,

Grom

afﬁrming the

t0 driving

When

argues the district court erred

under the

it

afﬁrmed

the magistrate court’s order denying his motion t0 suppress.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

Ofﬁcer Scholten was parked and observing trafﬁc near the intersection of 3rd
Street

the

and Hattie

Street.

Window down, drove by and

talking so loudly that

see

(7/12/17 T11, p. 13, L. 20

Grom

(Id.)

p. 14, L. 20.1)

the driver of the truck, later identiﬁed as

moving

his arms.

(Id.)

Ofﬁcer Scholten began

The black truck then turned off the road and

using a turn signal.

A black truck,

with

Grom, was

Ofﬁcer Scholten could hear him, and Ofﬁcer Scholten could also

“aggressively”

black truck.

—

(Id.)

to follow the

into a parking lot without

Ofﬁcer Scholten activated his overhead

lights

and stopped the

truck. (Id.)

As soon

as the truck pulled into a parking stall

exited the truck and

14, L. 15

—

p.

came up near Ofﬁcer Scholten’s

16, L. 17, p. 31, Ls. 9-13.)

Grom

“quickly and aggressively”

driver’s side door.

Grom was

argumentative and upset.

Ofﬁcer Scholten could smell the odor 0f an alcoholic beverage.

1

(7/12/17 Tr., p.

The ofﬁcer’s Videos were admitted as Defendant’s Exhibits
(7/12/17 Tr., p. 10, L. 3 —p. 11, L. 6; Exs. A, B.)

(Id.)

A

(Id.)

Grom’s speech was

and

B by

stipulation.

slurred and he had glassy, bloodshot eyes. (Id.) Officer Scholten told Grom that this was
a traffic stop and he was not free to leave. (Id.)
Additional officers arrived on scene to assist. (7/12/17 Tr., p. 16, L. 5 – p. 20, L.
3.) While Officer Scholten was speaking to the additional officers, Grom took off
running. (Id.)
Officer Scholten, and the other officers, gave chase. (Id.) Grom ran through the
parking lot of a car dealership and weaved in and out of the parked cars. (Id.) However,
the parking lot was bordered by a tall fence. (Id.) Grom could not get over the fence.
(Id.) Officer Scholten caught up to Grom and, after a brief physical confrontation, Officer
Scholten placed Grom in handcuffs. (Id.) Even after he was on the ground, Grom
continued to yell and cuss at the officers. (Id.)
Officer Scholten asked Grom if he was injured. (7/12/17 Tr., p. 20, L. 4 – p. 23,
L. 7.) Due to Grom’s running and the subsequent physical confrontation, Grom had to be
medically cleared through the Kootenai Medical Center before he could be transported to
the jail. (Id.) Officer Scholten transported Grom to the Kootenai Medical Center. (Id.)
Grom used vulgar language and was upset and wanted his attorney and Officer Scholten’s
badge number. (Id.)
At the hospital, Sergeant Averitt handled the evidentiary testing. (7/12/17 Tr., p.
29, Ls. 21-23.) Grom had finally calmed down, and Sergeant Averitt read him the ALS
advisory form. (7/12/17 Tr., p. 53, L. 5 – p. 58, L. 16; Ex. 1.) Grom did not fully follow
the instruction regarding the breath tests so Sergeant Averitt had to get three samples.
(Id.) Grom requested that the officers also take a blood sample. (Id.) Sergeant Averitt
2

arranged for a phlebotomist t0 take two blood samples.

(Id.)

Grom

did not request any

additional evidentiary testing. (Id.)

The Kootenai Medical Center medically cleared Grom. (7/12/17

—

When Grom was booked

p. 42, L. 5.)

call.

(7/12/17 Tr., p. 39, Ls. 15-19.) After

phone

(ﬂ 7/12/17

calls.

None 0f the

L. 7; EX. 2.)

The
13.)

into the jail,

state

Grom

charged

T11, p. 80, L.

calls

were

Grom

9

—

he was allowed t0 make a phone

Grom was booked

p. 84, L. 23;

to his attorney,

25

Tr., p. 41, L.

into jail,

he made thirteen

7/13/17 Tr., p. 138, L. 2 —p. 139,

Mr. Phelps.

(E

id.)

with driving under the inﬂuence, second offense. (R.,

p.

ﬁled a “Motion t0 Suppress/Dismiss” along With exhibits, afﬁdavits and a

supplemental

(R., pp. 39-56, 128-137.)

brief.

Grom

argued that his rights were violated

because he claimed he was entitled t0 access to his attorney during the trafﬁc stop and he

was unable

to obtain additional

court held a hearing

At

on the motion.

the hearing

Sergeant Averitt arrived,

ass[,]”

(Id.)

time of the stop.

(Id.)

The magistrate

to suppress, Sergeant Averitt testiﬁed

of Grom.

Grom was

worked-up, [and] hostile.”

at the

(R., pp. 138-155.)

on the motion

t0 assist in the foot pursuit

gonna sue your

blood testing

(7/12/17 Tr., p. 49, L. 22

already in custody.

Grom

(Id.)

—

lines 0f,

When

p. 52, L. 5.)

(C

Grom was

told Sergeant Averitt t0 “[c]all

and declaimed along the

he responded

Doug

“He’s gonna get

[p]rofane,

Phelps, I’m

me

off.”

(Id.)

Sergeant Averitt could also smell the odor 0f an intoxicant. (7/12/17 TL, p. 52, Ls. 6-13.)

The magistrate entered ﬁndings of fact 0n
p. 168, L. 19.)

a telephone,

it

The magistrate found

was

“directly

due

t0

that if there

Mr. Grom's

the record. (7/13/17 Tr., p. 161, L. 19

were any delay

own

in

Grom’s

ability t0

—

use

actions” because the time for medical

was due

clearance

Grom

t0

running away and having to be physically subdued.

Delays were also caused by Grom’s attempts to manipulate and “fudge” the breath
(Id.)

The magistrate

given time and opportunity to

Grom was

make phone

denied access to telephone

The magistrate

made

also

calls.

(Id.)

Grom was

The court found no evidence

that

(Id.)

the State; the other Vial

defendant.” (7/13/17 Tr., p. 167, L. 24

in

calls.

into the jail,

test.

a ﬁnding 0f fact that there were two blood draws:

was used by

“[o]ne of the Vials

When Grom was booked

also found that

(Id.)

— p.

for the

is

beneﬁt of the

168, L. 19.)

There would be no better evidence as far as the blood level present
-- or the alcohol level in Mr. Grom's blood than that test, so
Grom‘s
Mr.

based 0n his delay, the delays being due to his actions, and his request for
the blood which was acknowledged and done, he had access t0 the blood

and so

(Id.)

I'll

deny

it

on

The magistrate denied

Grom

--

those grounds, too.

the motion t0 suppress. (R., pp. 162-163.)

pled guilty and reserved the right t0 appeal the magistrate court’s denial of

the motion to suppress.

judgment.

that

(Id.)

suspension and

(R., pp.

156-159, 164-166.)

The magistrate court entered

However, the magistrate stayed Grom’s sentence, probation, license
jail

time pending the ﬁnal outcome 0f the appeal.

Grom timely appealed to the

district court.

(R., pp. 167—168.)

(R., pp. 170-172.)

memorandum

After a hearing, the district court entered a
decision 0f the magistrate. (R., pp. 239-251.)

The

district court

decision afﬁrming the

found that State

V. Carr,

128 Idaho 181, 911 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1995), was distinguishable.
This case presents a different fact pattern. Although in this case Defendant

was detained

for roughly

ﬁve

(5)

hours before being provided the

opportunity to contact counsel, this situation
In Carr,

is

distinguishable from Carr.

law enforcement prohibited Carr from contacting counsel for ﬁve
4

(5) hours after evidentiary testing had been completed, whereas in this
case, the Defendant’s own actions caused the delay in conducting the
evidentiary testing, and Defendant was provided the opportunity to contact
counsel within one (1) hour after testing was completed. Defendant’s
evidentiary testing was concluded at approximately 12:18 am on October
27, 2016. Tr., pp. 64-66. The magistrate judge found that Defendant
arrived at the jail at 12:41 am, was given the opportunity to call his
attorney no later than 1:00 am, and had sufficient amount of time to make
the calls (54 minutes from arrival to booking). Id. at 81-84, 108-109, 129130, 141, 164-165.
(R., pp. 243-244 (emphasis original, footnote omitted).) The district court concluded that
the magistrate did not err and Grom “was provided the opportunity to contact counsel
within a reasonable time after the completion of evidentiary testing.” (R., p. 244.)
The district court also ruled on an issue that was not raised before the magistrate
court, and held, that under controlling Idaho precedent, Idaho Code § 18-8002 is not
unconstitutional. (R., pp. 244-249.) Grom timely appealed. (R., pp. 256-259.)

5

ISSUES

Grom

states the issues

C.

on appeal

Did

the

as:

trial

court err

When

it

denied Defendant’s motion t0

suppress on the basis that his constitutional rights were violated

when law

enforcement ofﬁcers prevented him from contacting his attorney for an
unreasonable amount 0f time?

D.
Sixth

Does Idaho Code

Amendment

Defendant his right

because

rights

18-8002 Violate Defendant’s Fifth and

§

it

allows law enforcement t0 deny the

to counsel prior to evidentiary testing?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 4 (lettering original).)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Grom

2.

Did Grom

show the district court erred When
Grom’s motion t0 suppress?

failed to

magistrate court’s order denying

fail t0

preserve his claim that Idaho

unconstitutional because he failed t0 raise
t0

show

that the Fifth 0r Sixth

it

Amendments

Code

it

§

afﬁrmed the

18-8002(2)

is

before the magistrate court, and has he failed
are even implicated

by the

statute?

ARGUMENT
I.

The

A.

Trial Court

Did Not Err When It Afﬁrmed The Magistrate Court’s Order Denying
Grom’s Motion To Suppress

Introduction

The

district

Grom’s motion

court correctly afﬁrmed the decision of the magistrate denying

to suppress.

(E

Grom’s motion

R., pp. 239-251.)

correctly denied because the magistrate factually found that

use a telephone was caused by Grom’s
167, L. 19.)

The

own

actions.

district court also correctly

(E R., pp. 239-251.)
was

evidence

not

violated

(E 7/13/17

in

Grom’s

Grom’s due process

19

Grom

rights

was

ability to

Tr., p. 161, L.

found that the case 0n which

State V. Carr, supra, is distinguishable because

violated.

any delay

t0 suppress

—

p.

relies,

were not

Further Grom’s due process right t0 obtain favorable

because

Grom

asked

for,

and

received,

his

own

contemporaneous blood draw.

B.

Standard

On

Of Review

review 0f a decision rendered by a

capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s decision.”

De_Witt,

145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Losser

Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d

law

758 (2008)).

t0 the facts the appellate court Will

V.

If the district court properly applied the

afﬁrm the

LLser, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls
(1981)).

m

district court in its intermediate appellate

district court’s order.

V. Blaser,

EQ

(citing

102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137

The
standard.

m,
the

trial

Idaho

appellate court reviews the denial 0f a

State V. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607,

motion

389 P.3d 150, 152 (2016)

(citing

147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009)). The appellate court Will accept
court’s ﬁndings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Li. (citing

at

207, 207 P.3d at 183).

However, the appellate court

at

147

m,

147

207, 207 P.3d at 183).

The power

to assess the credibility

of witnesses, resolve factual conﬂicts, weigh

evidence, and draw factual inferences at a suppression hearing

m

m,

freely reviews the court’s

application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found. Li. (citing

Idaho

m

to suppress using a bifurcated

State V. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106,

vested in the

is

trial court.

897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State

V.

Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

C.

The District Court Correctly Afﬁrmed The Decision Of The Magistrate Denying
Grom’s Motion To Suppress
The magistrate court found

actions,”

including his running

manipulate the breath
additionally found that

test.

that

any delays “were directly due

away from ofﬁcers and

(7/13/17 Tr., p. 161, L. 19

Grom would have been

phone and he was provided access

—

his

— p.

deliberate

p. 167, L. 19.)

and allowed

Further, the magistrate found that the police complied With

defense. (7/13/17 Tr., p. 167, L. 24

Mr. Grom’s

draw was taken

168, L. 19.)

t0

own

attempts t0

The magistrate

allowed t0 get a phone number off his

t0 a telephone

additional testing and an additional blood

to

make

calls.

Grom’s request

for potential use in

cell

(Id.)

for an

Grom’s

The

district court

phone upon
completed

phone

(R., pp.

at the hospital.”

at the earlier time,

opportunity to

evidentiary testing.” (Id.)

On

was prejudiced

by holding

appeal to this Court,

him

t0

argument

is

that

Grom

DUI

obtain time sensitive evidence.”

after

completion of

the

argues the “blood test results in

until too

DUI

much

Cir, 128 Idaho

181, 911 P.2d

Contrary to Grom’s argument,

774

Cir

Grom

time had passed

Grom’s

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.)

(Ct.

relies primarily

App. 1995).

upon

Grom

case because

not supported by the record 0r the case law.

In support of his argument,

to the

case dismissed because Mr.

an attorney

to contact

t0

Defendant was provided the

in his inability to obtain exculpatory evidence in his

law enforcement did not allow him

was

burden entailed in providing access

and applying the magistrate’s factual ﬁndings

should have been suppressed and the

this case

after evidentiary testing

counsel Within a reasonable time

contact

provided access t0 a

“Taking into account the time needed

to the jail, the

relevant law, the magistrate did not err

for

42 minutes

(R., p. 244.)

from the hospital

Grom “was

239-244.)

his arrival at the jail, roughly

transport Defendant

to a

afﬁrmed.

the decision in

m

(ﬂ Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-10.)

supports the decision 0f the district court.

The police

stopped and arrested Carr for driving under the inﬂuence of alcohol. Cir, 128 Idaho

at

182, 911 P.2d at 775. Prior t0 evidentiary testing, Carr requested access to a telephone t0

call

her attorney.

Li.

The ofﬁcer informed Carr

attorney prior to taking the breath

test.

obtain an additional test at her expense.

.20/.21.

Li Carr was taken

had n0

right to consult

The ofﬁcer informed Carr

Li.

Li.

t0 a holding cell

that she

Carr agreed t0 the breath

and she again asked

to

an

that she could

test

and blew

speak t0 an attorney.

Li.

The ofﬁcers denied her request

for an attorney for

ﬁve

hours.

The

Li.

state

charged

Carr with misdemeanor DUI. Li.
Carr ﬁled a motion t0 dismiss or suppress, arguing that the state violated her right

under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

t0 counsel

motion.

Carr pled guilty and appealed.

Li.

suppressed the results of the breath

On

test.

The

Li.

The

The magistrate denied

911 P.2d

Idaho

to,

1,

reversed and

district court

state appealed. Li.

at 776.

“At the

outset,

we

or refusing, an evidentiary

t0,

note that the law

is

an evidentiary

5-6,

BAC

test.”

Li. (citing

LC.

§

BAC

test.

Li.

clear in Idaho that a driver

does not have the right t0 consult With an attorney prior to submitting

submit

the

appeal, the Court of Appeals reiterated that a driver does not have the right to

consult with an attorney prior to submitting

at 183,

Li.

Li.

t0,

18—8002(2); State

V.

0r refusing t0

Ankney, 109

704 P.2d 333, 337-338 (1985); Matter ochNeelv, 119 Idaho 182, 187, 804

P.2d 911, 916

App. 1990)).

(Ct.

constitutional rights

The Court then framed

the issue as Whether “Carr’s

were violated when the State denied her request

attorney following the administration of the State’s

BAC

test.”

Li.

to telephone her

(emphasis original).

Carr argued that she was denied assistance 0f counsel and that she was held in jail as the

critical

evidence, the alcohol content of her blood,

Appeals applied a due process analysis

life,

destroyed. Li.

t0 Carr’s argument.

“The due process clause 0f the United
of

was

ﬂQ

States Constitution prohibits deprivations

liberty or property without ‘fundamental fairness’ through

that offends the

community’s sense ofjustice, decency and

183-184, 911 P.2d

at

776-777

(citing

Roberts

10

The Idaho Court of

V. State

governmental conduct

fair play.”

Cir, 128 Idaho

of Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1291

at

(1st

Cir. 1995)).

“‘The right 0f an accused in a criminal

trial t0

right to a fair opportunity t0 defend against the

Chambers

V. Mississippi,

rules, is not a technical

circumstances.”’

Li

“Rather, ‘due process

situation

demands.”

is,

in essence, the

State’s accusations.”’ Li. (quoting

410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973)).

“Due

process, unlike

some

legal

conception With a ﬁxed content unrelated t0 time, place and

Workers

(citing Cafeteria

is

due process

V.

McElrov, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).

ﬂexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular

Li. (citing

Morrissev

The Court 0f Appeals applied a

V.

Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).

three-factor test to determine whether state action

violates procedural due process. Speciﬁcally, the court considered:

(1) the private interest that Will

(2)

be affected by the ofﬁcial action;

the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the

existing procedures used and the probable value, if any, 0f additional 0r
substitute procedural safeguards;

(3) the

ﬁscal

government’s

and

interest, including the function

administrative

burdens

procedural requirement would

Li. (citing

Mathews

Applying

V. Eldridge,

this test, the

interest in procuring evidence

Li.

Because the

state

and

that

the

involved and the

additional

0r

substitute

entail.

424 U.S.

3 19,

Court found,

335 (1976)).

ﬁrst, that the private interest

which would challenge the

results

was “Carr’s

of the State’s

BAC test.”

denied Carr access t0 a telephone for ﬁve hours, the state deprived

her of the means by Which she could establish her defense. Li.

Second, the Court found that a procedure that denies a defendant arrested for

DUI

access to a telephone until well after the alcohol has dissipated in the blood stream

11

deprives a defendant 0f her interest in obtaining evidence for her defense. Li. at 185, 911

P.2d

778.

at

Third, the state failed t0 demonstrate any reason for refusing to allow Carr access

t0 her attorney until several hours after the administration

0f the

concluded that Carr was denied her right to due process.

Li.

that

BAC test.

Li.

The Court

The Court 0f Appeals held

because Carr’s due process right was denied, the appropriate remedy would be

suppression 0f the results of the

This case

is

BAC test.

Li.

very different from Cir.

As noted by

the district court, Carr

was

deprived of access t0 an attorney for ﬁve hours after the completion 0f BAC testing. (R.,
pp. 243-244.)

In contrast,

Grom was

provided access to a telephone, and the contact

information on his cell phone, within one hour 0f the completion of the evidentiary

(E Q)

testing.

Grom’s

Applying the three-factor

“interest in obtaining his

substantial, but

own

test,

the district court correctly noted that

evidence to challenge the state’s evidence remains

Defendant was provided access to a phone upon his

roughly 42 minutes after evidentiary testing was completed

Grom’s

reliance

number of reasons. As

is

testing.

706, 710, 239 P.3d 81

m,

We

815

(Ct.

App. 2010). In

testing is misplaced for a

not violated

allowed access t0 a telephone after evidentiary

1,

at the hospital.” (Id.)

on elapsed time before the evidentiary
a legal matter due process

arrival at the jail,

ﬂ

when

a defendant

the Idaho Court

oprpeals

access t0 a telephone until after the blood draw.

scheme 0f implied consent,

testing,

and a

defendant's right to independent testing, together with case law

making

Idaho's

statutory

clear that the State
ability to preserve

may

State

not prevent 0r unreasonably delay the defendant's

evidence of sobriety after submission t0 the State's
12

only

State V. Green, 149 Idaho

conclude that there was no Violation of Green's right t0 due process

When he was denied

is

test,

held:

are adequate t0 safeguard a suspect's due process rights. This statutory

scheme

both the

facilitates

and the defendant's

State's interests

interest in

preserving evanescent evidence.

As

a factual matter, as noted below, the delay in evidentiary testing

caused by Grom’s actions.

Grom ﬂed from

confrontation Which necessitated a hospital

breath

test.

(E 7/13/17

Tr., p. 161, L.

prongs of the due process

19

test relate t0 the

—

the

As

p. 167, L. 19.)

BAC

state’s

exist until the actual evidentiary testing has taken place.

There

obtain his

p.

and also

fatally, for

own blood draw

167, L. 24

—

is

when the

Grom’s case

is

clock

The holding

in

is

exactly What happened here.

rebut 0r challenge the state’s blood draw. There

is

is

starts

BAC

Oﬂ

is

three

own

evidence does not

nothing t0 rebut until

running.

Grom

testing.

(E 7/13/17 TL,

premised on the due process

requirement of the defendant being able t0 obtain his or her
evidence — and that

all

the factual ﬁnding that he did in fact

for testing to rebut the state’s

168, L. 19.).

p.

manipulate the

a logical matter,

The

Finally,

t0

defendant being able to obtain his or her

evidence to rebut the state’s evidentiary evidence.

the evidentiary testing has occurred, so that

directly

engaged in a physical

police,

and then attempted

trip,

was

own

test t0 rebut the state’s

obtained his

own blood draw t0

n0 due process reason why the

state’s

blood draw should be suppressed.

Grom

has failed to show the district court erred

the magistrate court.

the

trial

The

district court correctly

court and afﬁrmed.

Grom’s due process

13

when

it

afﬁrmed the judgment of

applied the law to the facts as found

rights

by

were not violated because he was

provided access t0 a telephone Within an hour of evidentiary testing, and because the
police provided, at

Grom’s

request, an additional blood

draw

for use in his

own

defense.

II.

Grom’s Claim That Idaho Code

S

18-8002

Is

Unconstitutional

Is

Not Preserved; Nor

Is It

Meritorious

A.

Introduction

Grom

failed to raise his constitutional challenge t0 Idaho

before the magistrate court; therefore,

it is

Code

§

18-8002(2)

not preserved for appeal t0 this Court.

(ﬂ R.,

pp. 39-56, 128-137.) This Court Will not consider unpreserved claims.

Even

if the merits are considered,

Grom

18-8002(2), which provides that an individual

evidentiary testing,

failed t0

show

that

is

has failed to show that that Idaho Code §
is

not entitled to contact counsel prior t0

unconstitutional under the Fifth and Sixth

any of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were even implicated,

alone violated, by Idaho

Code

right

counsel does not even attach until formal

to

adversarial judicial proceedings have been initiated.

prophylactic that

is

The

Fifth

Amendment

2

the Fifth or Sixth

Miranda

V.

applies the

used t0 help prevent compelled self—incrimination;

tests for

Grom has

failed to

the presence 0f alcohol d0 not implicate compelled self—incrimination.

show

let

§ 18-8002(2).

The Sixth Amendment

m2

Amendments. Grom has

Amendment even

apply in these circumstances.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
14

B.

Standard

On

Of Review

review 0f a decision rendered by a

district court in its intermediate appellate

capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s decision.”

145 Idaho

71

at

1,

184 P.3d

at

217

(citation omitted).

the law to the facts the appellate court will

De_Witt,

If the district court properly applied

afﬁrm the

district court’s order.

EQ

(citations omitted).

Constitutional questions are questions 0f law, over

exercises free review.

State V. Akins, 164 Idaho 74, 76,

(citing State V. Baeza, 161

Sweden

C.

Irrigation Dist,

Grom

Failed

T0 Challenge The

Of LC. S 18-8002 In The
Not Preserved For Appeal T0 This Court

Constitutionality
Is

Grom

argued, for the ﬁrst time, that Idaho

18-8002 violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because

he submits

issue

was not
The

t0,

0r refuses, evidentiary testing.

raised before the

constitutionality

magistrate court.

V.

New

160 Idaho 47, 51, 368 P.3d 990, 994 (2016)).

appeal to the district court

until

423 P.3d 1026, 1028 (2018)

Idaho 38, 40, 383 P.3d 1208, 1210 (2016); Morgan

Court; Therefore That Challenge

On

Which the appellate court

trial court, this

0f Idaho Code

(E R., pp.

39-56, 128-137.)

Code

§

denies his right to counsel

it

(ﬂ R., pp. 230-238.)

Court should not consider

§

Trial

it

Because

this

on appeal.

18-8002(2) was not raised before the

Grom

relied,

almost exclusively, 0n an

application 0f State V. Carr, supra, and did not raise the constitutionality of the statute.

(E m.)
Issues not raised before the magistrate, even if raised

court, are not preserved for appeal t0 the higher court.

15

m

on appeal

t0 the district

State V. Tucker, 124 Idaho

621, 622, 862 P.2d 313, 314 (Ct. App. 1993);

ﬂ

also Nat'l

122 Idaho 401, 402, 834 P.2d 1317, 1318 (1992).

When

Bank of Washington

V. Tate,

the district court considers an

appeal from the magistrate court, the district court acts as an appellate court, and thus the
higher appellate court will “not consider assignments 0f error that were presented to the

district court

were

on appeal unless we would have considered those issues

TLker, 124 Idaho

t0 this court.”

at

if the initial

appeal

m

622, 862 P.2d at 314 (citing State V. Kenner,

ﬂ alﬂ

121 Idaho 594, 596-597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308-1309 (1992); I.C.R. 54.2);

Garcia—Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 274-276, 296 P.3d 700, 703-705 (2017) (the Court
freely reviews

Whether a party properly preserved a claim for appellate review and a

claim not preserved Will not be considered 0n appeal).
Idaho Code § 18-8002(2) was not raised before the
not consider

it

Here, the constitutionality of

court’s opinion.

§

this

(E R., pp.

244-249.)

is

highlighted

While discussing the

18-8002(2), the district court expressed that

it

did not

this threat in light

of the circumstances?”

effect the disruption

district court’s

of a

cell

phone

call

(Id.)

The

the district

know Whether

district court also

would have 0n

by

constitutionality

concerns 0f the police were actual 0r hypothetical, and questioned “what

The

Court should

0n appeal.

Part 0f the rationale behind this preservation rule

Code

and thus

trial court,

is

0f Idaho

the safety

the reality of

questioned what

the pending investigation.

questions are factual questions that should have been addressed

magistrate as a fact ﬁnder.

However, since Grom did not

(Id.)

by the

raise this issue before the

magistrate court, none of these issues could have been addressed in the hearing.

Regardless of the factual nature of the

district court’s concerns,

16

it is

black

letter

law

that

because the constitutionality 0f Idaho Code § 18-8002 was not raised in the magistrate
court,

D.

and thus

Even

cannot

If This

Failed

And

it

now be

considered 0n appeal.

Court Reaches The Merits

T0 Show That Idaho Code S 18-8002(2) Implicates Or
Amendments T0 The United States Constitution

Grom Has

Claim,

Violates

The

Fifth

Sixth

Grom

argues

Amendments because
evidentiary testing.

that

it

Idaho

Code

E

18-8002(2)

§

(ﬂ Appellant’s brief, pp.

I.C. §

violates

the

Fifth

denies his right to counsel until he submits

the procedure for evidentiary testing

inﬂuence.

Of Grom’s Unpreserved

The

18-8002.

When an

10-23.)

individual

Idaho Code

is

§

t0,

and Sixth
0r refuses,

18-8002 outlines

suspected of driving under the

statute provides, in part, that a

person suspected of

driving under the inﬂuence “shall not have the right to consult With an attorney before

Grom

submitting to such evidentiary testing.” LC. § 18-8002(2).

changes to Fourth

Amendment law

argues that the recent

regarding evidentiary tests for alcohol “should

prohibit the legislature from bypassing constitutional protections of the Fifth and Sixth

Amendments and

Amendment

implying, 0r otherwise requiring, a waiver 0f the Fifth and Sixth

rights t0 consult with counsel

testing in Violation of the Fourth

(Appellant’s brief, p. 23.)

While Grom

recently evolved in the area 0f

connect

how

these Fourth

Amendment

DUI

is

testing

upon

the act 0f submitting to evidentiary

right to

be

free

from warrantless searches.”

correct that Fourth

Amendment law

and implied consent,

Amendment changes have even

Grom

has

has failed to

implicated the Fifth or Sixth

Amendments.
The Sixth Amendment

right to counsel only attaches at 0r after the time that

adversarial judicial proceedings have been initiated.

17

ﬂ, gg, Kirby V. Illinois, 406 U.S.

682, 688 (1972);

(Ct.

ﬂ

Harmon, 131 Idaho

also State V.

App. 1998) (n0 Sixth Amendment

80, 86-87,

952 P.2d 402, 408-409

right to counsel until actually charged with

934 P.2d 943, 946-947

State V. Shelton, 129 Idaho 877, 880-881,

(Ct.

constitutional 0r statutory right to counsel immediately following the

0f McNeely, 119 Idaho 182, 186—87, 804 P.2d 911, 915—916

Amendment
[the

right t0 counsel prior t0

BAC

testing).

(Ct.

DUI);

App. 1997) (no

BAC

test); Ma_tter

App. 1990) (n0 Sixth

“In a line of constitutional cases in

United States Supreme Court] stemming back to the Court's landmark opinion in

Powell

v.

Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53

S.Ct. 55,

77 L.Ed. 158 [(1932)],

established that a person's Sixth and Fourteenth

only

m,
The

406 U.S.

at

688

right to counsel attaches

(citations omitted).

from a mere
point of our whole system 0f adversary

of judicial criminal proceedings

initiation

formalism.

has been ﬁrmly

time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against

at or after the

him.”

Amendment

it

is

It

the starting

criminal justice. For
itself t0 prosecute,

it

is

is

far

only then that the government has committed

and only then

and defendant have solidiﬁed.

that the adverse positions

It is

0f government

then that a defendant ﬁnds himself

faced With the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in
the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.
therefore, that

It is

this point,

marks the commencement of the ‘criminal prosecutions'

Which alone the

explicit

guarantees

0f the

Sixth

Amendment

to

are

applicable.

Li. at

688-689

(citing Powell,

(1964); Spano V.

New

287 U.S.

at

York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959) (Douglas,

t0 the evidentiary testing

and

citation there is

no attachment of the Sixth Amendment
Fourth

Amendment

66-71; Massiah V. United States, 377 U.S. 201

law, Idaho

Code

no

concurring)).

Prior

judicial proceeding initiated and, thus,

right to counsel.

Regardless 0f any changes to

§ 18-8002(2)’s prohibition

18

J.,

on consulting with an

attorney before submitting to evidentiary testing does not implicate, let alone Violate, the

Sixth

Amendment.

Nor does Idaho Code
Amendment. The

N0

Fifth

§

18-8002(2) implicate,

let

alone Violate, the Fifth

Amendment provides:

person shall be held to answer for a

capital, or

crime, unless 0n a presentment or indictment of a

otherwise infamous

Grand

Jury, except in

cases arising in the land 0r naval forces, 0r in the Militia,

when

in actual

service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subj ect for

same offence t0 be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a Witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, 0r property, without due process of law; nor shall

the

private property be taken for public use, Without just compensation.

U.S. Const.

amend V.

“The
counsel.”

Fifth

Hughes

Amendment does
V. State,

not contain speciﬁc language regarding a right t0

148 Idaho 448, 457, 224 P.3d 515, 524 (Ct. App. 2009). “The

Fifth

Amendment provides

a constitutional right against self—incrimination.” Li. “It

Sixth

Amendment which

expressly provides a right t0 the assistance of counsel.”

However, under limited circumstances the

m

However, the United States Supreme Court recognized

that there are

When a person may require the assistance 0f counsel
Amendment right against self—incrimination but a Sixth

limited circumstances

Amendment right t0 counsel has not attached. These limited circumstances
arise when the person is interrogated while in custody, which the Supreme
Court has recognized exposes the person to an unacceptable risk 0f

compelled

self—incrimination.

Consequently,

in

Miranda

the

Court

recognized a right to counsel as a prophylactic protection of the Fifth

Amendment

right

against compelled self—incrimination in a custodial

interrogation setting.

Amendment

This right t0 counsel

is

derivative of the Fifth

right against self—incrimination, but is

Amendment
Amendment right

As

commonly

referred to

a further protection 0f the

as the Fifth

right t0 counsel.

Fifth

against self—incrimination, the

19

the

Li.

prophylactic can attach to protect

against compelled self—incrimination before the initiation of formal charges:

t0 protect the Fifth

is

Miranda Court

required that a person in such custodial interrogation setting must be

advised 0f the right against self—incrimination and the right to the presence

0f an attorney during such interrogation.

mm, 148 Idaho

at

has failed t0 argue,

let

457, 224 P.3d at 524 (citing

Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-23.)

Amendment

Instead

right to counsel

Amendment

Grom merely
was

violated.

authority or argument to demonstrate that this Fifth

issues

471-473).

Grom

are not supported

(E

states, in

a conclusory fashion, that

(m

Since

id.)

Amendment

Grom

cites

n0

legal

prophylactic applied, to

Amendment” argument should

State V. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966,

0n appeal

at

right to counsel” attached.

the circumstances of his evidentiary testing, his “Fifth

be considered.

384 U.S.

alone show, that these limited circumstances existed and thus, the

prophylactic referred to as the “Fifth

his Fifth

m,

by propositions 0f law,

not

970 (1996) (“When

authority, or argument, they

Will not be considered”).

Even
it still

fails

if this

because

unpreserved, unsupported Fifth

it is

protects the accused

Amendment argument

is

considered,

well established that the privilege against self—incrimination only

from a compulsion

t0 give testimony against

him

or herself 0r to

otherwise give “evidence of a testimonial 0r communicative nature.” Harmon, 131 Idaho

at 84,

Fifth

952 P.2d

at

Amendment

406

(citing

Schmerber

V. California,

384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966)). The

privilege against self—incrimination does not prevent the state

from

compelling the production 0f physical evidence, such as providing a breathe 0r blood
sample.

Court

E, gg, United States V. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-223 (1967).

stated, ‘[i]n the context

of an

arrest for driving

of Whether the suspect Will take a blood-alcohol

20

“[T]he Supreme

While intoxicated, a police inquiry

test is

not an interrogation Within the

meaning ofMiranda.”

m,

NLille, 459 U.S. 553, 564
consent law, or Fourth

n.

131 Idaho at 85, 952 P.2d at 407 (citing South Dakota V.

15 (1983)).

Amendment

Thus, regardless 0f any changes to implied

law, the Fifth

Amendment

prophylactic protection of

a right t0 counsel does not even attach Where the police ask for a blood 0r breath

Thus, the protections of the Fifth
18-8002(2),

let

Amendment

are not even implicated

test.

by Idaho Code

§

alone violated.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the judgment of the

district court.
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